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Introduction: The Myth of Liberation 
 On March 12, 2004, almost exactly a year after the formal beginning of the U.S. war on 
Iraq and during International Women’s Week, George W. Bush gave a speech championing the 
so-called “liberation” of 25 million Iraqi and Afghani women. He emphasized the importance of 
promoting democracy in the Middle East so that women may be able to “take their rightful place 
in societies that were once incredibly oppressive and closed.”1 That a foreign invasion resulting 
in two of the longest wars in U.S. history qualifies as “liberation” for women is obviously 
questionable, and that the U.S. project in the war on terror was driven by a desire to promote 
“democracy” should be suspect to anyone who has seen photographs of Abu Ghraib. Moreover, 
feminist scholar Chandra Mohanty has argued that universal claims about the oppression of 
Third World women serve to write those women “outside history.”2 In this essay I focus on the 
conditions for women in pre-invasion Iraq in an attempt to historicize the specific relationships 
of women to the state, the family, and other institutions shaping their lived realities. I seek to 
both portray the diversity of Iraqi women’s experiences and to emphasize their agency, rather 
than situating them as passive victims of the Iraqi regime, U.S. imperialism, or international 
policy. Refuting Bush’s ahistorical conception of Iraq as an “oppressive and closed” society for 
women, I examine the complex reality for Iraqi women under the United Nations policy of 
comprehensive economic sanctions, enforced on Iraq largely due to U.S. pressure, from 1990-
2003. 
 The sanctions on Iraq were broad reaching and were strengthened in 1991. The effect of 
these sanctions was compounded by the fact that U.S. invading forces during the Gulf War of 
 
1 “President, Mrs. Bush Mark Progress in Global Women’s Human Rights,” accessed October 14, 2019, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040312-5.html. 
2 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” 
Feminist Review, no. 30 (1988): 70. 
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1990-1991 had bombed sanitation and water facilities across the country. This created a terrible 
public health crisis because the sanctions’ economic effect made it impossible to rebuild these 
facilities. Sanctions killed thousands of Iraqis and caused widespread poverty and malnutrition. 
Particularly devastating were the statistics on child mortality; in 1996 it was reported that half a 
million Iraqi children had died as a result of sanctions policy. Though this number was later 
estimated to be closer to 350,000 from 1990-2000, this impact was still tragic and deeply 
harmful. The under-5 mortality rate rose from 56 per 1000 births to 131 per 1000 births during 
the sanctions era.3 Beyond just the death toll, sanctions devastated the Iraqi economy and day to 
day life of almost all Iraqis.  
The pre-sanctions relationship of the Iraqi state to women was complex. Prior to the 
imposition of sanctions and under the Ba‘thi government a number of legislative changes 
transitioned women from a private to a public social and economic role and limited the control of 
male family members over women, but these laws also increased the patriarchal control of the 
state itself over women.4 The Ba‘th also created a violent security state that tortured and 
executed anyone suspected of opposing the regime (particularly communist opposition) and in no 
way discriminated between men and women. However, when we discuss the conditions of Iraqi 
women in the pre-invasion era, a nuanced analysis requires far more than blaming the Iraqi state. 
It is necessary to analyze the sanctions era to understand the changes in both legal and social 
dynamics for Iraqi women in the decade before the U.S. invasion of 2003.   
 
3 Mohamed M. Ali and Iqbal H Shah, “Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq,” The Lancet 355, no. 
9218 (May 27, 2000): 1851; Richard Garfield, “Morbidity and Mortality among Iraqi Children,” (report, Columbia 
University, 1999), 35.  
4 Yasmin Husein Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions (London; 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 28. 
3 
 
 This essay analyzes the broad ranging impacts of international sanctions on Iraqi women 
and gender relations. In this study, the changes in women’s positions will be analyzed across the 
following categories: education, employment, family relations, marriage, violence against 
women, and political participation. These categories of change are explored with the 
understanding that the experiences of Iraqi women under sanctions varied massively based on a 
variety of class, ethnic, and religious considerations. By analyzing sanctions primarily through 
the lens of gender analysis, with attention to other compounding factors in the understanding of 
women’s oppression, I make two arguments. Firstly, I argue that the comprehensive economic 
sanctions imposed on Iraq should not be viewed as a nonviolent alternative to war, but rather as a 
deeply violent act that continuously harmed the country’s most marginalized populations, in this 
case women. Secondly, I argue that these sanctions effectively undermined the movement for 
Iraqi women’s liberation not only by creating a more immediate economic concern to divert 
public attention from women’s oppression, but by actively reversing the general social transition 
towards gender equity since 1968.  
 
Literature Review: A Gender Critique of Sanctions in Development 
 A gender analysis of the sanctions on Iraq is a critical addition to the new and developing 
scholarship on sanctions and should be understood within the imperialist relationship of the 
United States to Iraq. Scholarly works on sanctions and on gender in Iraq have had very little 
overlap. Though there exists a great deal of work on the harmful effects of sanctions, these works 
typically focus more broadly and lack gender analysis. Conversely, the feminist and gender-
focused writing on Iraq and imperial violence tends to focus on the impacts of war and not on the 
sanctions era. Though there is a growing body of work on the experience of Iraqi women during 
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the 2003 Iraq war, and even a sizeable amount of scholarship on the experience of being a 
woman soldier during the Iraq war, there is notably almost no scholarship specifically on the 
gendered experience of sanctions in Iraq. Research on the violence of sanctions on marginalized 
populations beyond Iraq is also expanding, but the work that does exist has potential to inform 
our understanding of Iraqi sanctions. The most important works on which this paper draws are 
case studies and oral histories that highlight the specificities of Iraqi women’s experiences under 
sanctions through their own voices. These sources are critical to developing a feminist 
understanding of sanctions.  
 There are three primary scholars doing deep work to develop a gendered impact of 
sanctions in Iraq. In general, research on Iraq is highly limited because of the dangerous 
conditions in the country and the destruction of so many archives since the 2003 invasion. As 
such, much of the secondary analysis I have been able to draw on is from one author, Nadje al-
Ali, and her sometimes co-author, Nicola Pratt. Al-Ali’s 2007 book Iraqi Women: Untold Stories 
from 1948 to the Present focuses on the period between British colonialism in Iraq and the U.S. 
occupation, arguing that the experience of women in the post-invasion era cannot be understood 
without the vast historical context of developing gender relations. Her study is conducted 
through personal narratives and oral histories of women who experienced the changes in Iraq 
firsthand. Chapter five, “Living With War and Sanctions,” focuses on the experience of women 
during the sanctions, and argues that the sanctions not only had specific, gendered effects, but 
that “women and gender ideologies and relations were … at the centre of social and cultural 
change during this period.”5 This analysis is brief and could certainly be further developed.  
 
5 Nadje Sadig Al-Ali, Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present (London ; New York: Zed 
Books, 2007), 175. 
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 Al-Ali has also written several articles in relation to this topic, two of which are 
additional sources for this paper. “Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women Between Dictatorship, 
War, Sanctions, and Occupation,” written in 2008, discusses the development of gender relations 
and the discourse on women in the Iraqi nation-building process under Saddam Hussein. Her 
primary focus is the long-term trajectory of gender relations in Iraqi politics and society. This 
piece provides important historical context and focuses more specifically on the Iraqi state’s 
relationship to women as part of the nation. Though it provides less focus on sanctions directly, it 
helps illuminate the development of state rhetoric and action with regard to women’s rights and 
thus the effect of sanctions on state policy.  
 Al-Ali and Pratt’s 2009 book What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation of 
Iraq, and their 2011 article “Conspiracy of Near Silence: Violence Against Iraqi Women,” 
though excellent contributions to scholarship, focus on post-invasion Iraq, dealing less directly 
with the experience of women under sanctions, and so are not as relevant to this study. What 
they add is important perspective on the experience of Iraqi Kurdish women under sanctions, and 
the specificities of Kurdish governance and standing in the eyes of the international community, 
imperialist powers, and Iraqi government that contribute to violence against women. Al-Ali’s 
work has built a multifaceted gender analysis of sanctions that is situated in Iraqi and Ba‘thi 
history, but that also carries forward the impacts of sanctions on women to paint a more complex 
picture of the particular struggles of women in post-invasion Iraq.  
 The other major scholarship on gender and sanctions in Iraq that must be discussed, and 
in fact the only full-length book on the topic, is the 2008 book Women in Iraq: The Gender 
Impacts of International Sanctions, by Yasmin Al-Jawaheri. Al-Jawaheri’s work is a vast study 
that combines statistical analysis with a comprehensive process of survey, interview, and case 
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studies of women from various class, family, and educational backgrounds in Baghdad. Through 
this work, Al-Jawaheri argues that, despite the fact that Iraqi laws regarding women’s rights 
stayed relatively static during the sanctions era, the sanctions contributed to a reversal of the 
social gains for women, in large part due to the state’s failure to enforce the laws guaranteeing 
women’s participation in education and the work force.6 Though this work is perhaps the most 
comprehensive analysis of women’s rights under sanctions, its geographic scope is limited to 
Baghdad, likely as a result of the difficulty of conducting research across Iraq. Not only does it 
lack a perspective on the experience of rural women and women in other regions, but it is 
missing any analysis on the experience of women in Iraqi Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region 
with its own unique history under sanctions that is critical to understanding the broader 
experience of “Iraqi women.”  
 Though the research specifically directed towards Iraq is limited, it is critical to situate 
the experience of Iraqi women in the international context. A. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen 
have written a cross-national study of the gendered effects of coercive economic sanctions which 
concludes that “sanctions are detrimental to women’s rights” because sanctions reduce respect 
for women’s rights, as quantified in the study.7 They analyze respect with regard to women’s 
economic, social, and political status. The authors suggest that the unintended consequences of 
policy can be best understood by looking at the policy’s effect on the country’s most vulnerable 
groups.8 This study is a broad analysis of sanctions’ effect on women; my research complements 
 
6 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 140. 
7 A. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen, “Women and Economic Statecraft: The Negative Impact 
International Economic Sanctions Visit on Women,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 2 (June 
2014): 463, 483. 
8 Ibid, 484.  
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this broad study by proposing specific ways in which women experience this loss of status in the 
context of sanctions on Iraq.  
 Other cross-national studies of sanctions with a focus on human rights and other 
marginalized populations also inform this study. Research by Peksen on the human rights 
consequences of sanctions and by Zhike Lv and Ting Zu on ethnic violence increases as a result 
of sanctions provide two important insights. Firstly, these studies illustrate that the experience of 
women under sanctions is not unique but rather part of the broader violence of sanctions against 
marginalized populations. Secondly, they are critical for understanding the intersecting 
experiences of women and sanctions; the Lv and Zu study is particularly important for 
understanding the multiple violences experienced by Kurdish, Assyrian, and other ethnic 
minority women.  
 Ultimately, this field of scholarship is continually expanding, though the existing work in 
the field has been strong. This paper agrees with much of the work by Al-Ali, Pratt, and Al-
Jawaheri, but also aims to situate the conversation about the gendered impacts of sanctions in 
Iraq in a broader conversation about the catastrophic violence of the sanctions on Iraq, and the 
critique of international sanctions as a form of economic violence, as opposed to a non-violent 
alternative to war.  
 
Sanctioning Iraq: A History of Violence 
 In their recent article, “Violence on Iraqi Bodies: Decolonising Economic Sanctions in 
Security Studies,” Mariam Georgis and Riva Gewarges, two Iraqi Assyrian women who survived 
sanctions while living in Baghdad, argue that understanding the violence of sanctions 
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necessitates decentering the state and focusing on the experience of the Iraqi people.9 By 
portraying Saddam Hussein as a security threat to U.S. civilians, the consequences of sanctions 
become justified; it is only by othering Iraqi bodies that the violence of sanctions can be written 
off as a price worth paying.10 Crucially, they also view the imposition of sanctions as an 
extension of colonial violence on the Global South. This article goes hand-in-hand with recent 
transnational data-analyses on sanctions in relation to human rights; research shows that 
sanctions, particularly comprehensive sanctions rather than partial sanctions, worsens human 
rights abuses related to “physical integrity,” defined as freedom from extralegal killing, torture, 
disappearance, etc., ethnic violence, and respect for women’s rights.11 Georgis and Gewarges’s 
framework for understanding sanctions is an important part of the process of rehumanizing Iraqis 
in the discussion of sanctions, a precursor to understanding the gender violence of sanctions. 
Here I will present a brief overview of the sanctions program and the structural flaws that 
contributed to its violence.  
 The sanctions against Iraq began in August of 1990 and continued until May 22, 2003, 
after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown by the U.S. invading forces. Initially, the sanctions 
were put in place with the goal of forcing Iraq out of Kuwait, though this goal was quickly 
achieved by the use of military force during the first Gulf War. The sanctions, however, were not 
lifted. Instead, they were reframed with the goal of forcing the Iraqi government’s compliance 
with ongoing UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections to ensure that the government 
was not harboring chemical weapons in the wake of the Anfal genocide, a series of attacks on 
 
9 Mariam Georgis and Riva Gewarges, “Violence on Iraqi Bodies: Decolonising Economic Sanctions in 
Security Studies,” Third World Quarterly 40, no. 2 (February 1, 2019): 320. 
10 Ibid, 327. 
11 Dursun Peksen, “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” Journal of 
Peace Research 46, no. 1 (January 2009): 59; Drury and Peksen, “Women and Economic Statecraft,” 483; Zhike Lv 
and Ting Xu, “The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Ethnic Violence of Target States: A Panel Data Analysis,” The 
Social Science Journal 54, no. 1 (March 2017): 105 
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Iraqi Kurdistan from 1986-1989 which killed up to 182,000 Iraqi Kurds and several thousand 
Assyrians. However, many researchers, political activists, and government officials have 
acknowledged that the U.S. approach towards sanctions was focused on the end of the Saddam 
Hussein regime rather than the weapons inspections. At least at the beginning of sanctions, the 
idea that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam was in power was openly discussed.12 
But even after it became clear that Saddam would not quickly give up his power, U.S. officials 
maintained the importance of Saddam’s downfall as a precursor to lifting sanctions, despite the 
severe impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi population. Estimates of child mortality rates initially 
suggested that more than half a million Iraqi children were killed by sanctions by 1996. 
Recently, more conservative estimates have suggested that this number is closer to 350,000 from 
1990-2000, but the under-five mortality rate did increase from 56 per 1000 births to 131 per 
1000 births under sanctions.13 In general, access to health and food resources in Iraq were fatally 
low for much of the population. By the mid-1990s, it was no longer possible to ignore the deadly 
impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi population. In 1995, the UN established the Oil for Food 
Program (OFF) in an attempt to mitigate the impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi public. This 
program enabled Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian needs. 
However, this program was severely limited by corruption and allocation issues. Yasmin Al-
Jawaheri has written that, in part because of their control of OFF implementation, “Saddam 
Hussein and his henchmen, over more than thirteen years of sanctions, grew obscenely rich as a 
 
12 Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London ; New York : 
IBTauris in association with MERIP ; distributed by StMartin’s Press, 1999), 62. 
13 Ali and Shah, “Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq,” 1851; David Cortright, “A Hard Look at Iraq 
Sanctions,” The Nation, November 15, 2001. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hard-look-iraq-sanctions/ 
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direct result of sanctions that were meant to punish them.”14 This wealth was also generated 
through smuggling of oil and hoarding of what little resources Iraq still had.  
A contributing factor to OFF’s failures to mitigate the public health crisis was the 
separation of funds between Iraqi Kurdistan and the remaining regions of Iraq. Kurdistan 
received a disproportionate share of the funds per capita and the money to pay for OFF’s 
beureaucratic operations came only out of the Central and South budget. Purchases for Kurdistan 
also had to be prepaid out of the Central and South budget, with exceptionally long 
reimbursement periods.15 Though it is true that Kurdistan had been disadvantaged for years 
under the Ba‘th regime and that Kurdistan faced particular difficulty with the high number of 
internally displaced peoples, Kurdistan also experienced a remarkably high influx of aid and 
NGO support. This aid influx was not entirely effective, but the misallocation of resources meant 
that OFF did little to stop the humanitarian crisis in South and Central Iraq.  
Even if OFF had functioned entirely as intended, it would not have fully compensated for 
the economic and humanitarian crisis impacts of sanctions. Dennis Halliday, former UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, alleged that OFF “was never intended to actually resolve the 
humanitarian crisis,” but merely served to stop it from worsening.16 He was highly critical of the 
bureaucratic processes behind approving OFF purchases, which he saw as highly politicized to 
serve the interests of the U.S. and U.K. Hans von Sponeck, who took over Halliday’s position 
after he resigned in protest of the sanctions, was also highly critical of the OFF program on many 
 
14 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 5-6.  
15 Von Sponeck, A Different Kind of War, 18-19. 
16 Phyllis Bennis and Denis J. Halliday, interviewed by David Barsamian, “Iraq: The Impact of Sanctions 
and US Policy,” in Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, ed. Anthony Arnove (Cambridge, 
MA: South End Press, 2000), 36.   
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fronts, from the inadequacy of the budget to begin rebuilding the devastated water and sanitation 
infrastructure, to the failure to designate a specific fund for education.  
From the mid-1990s onward, the sanctions continued to be enforced despite the clear 
human rights impacts, and the blame for the humanitarian crisis was placed entirely onto the 
Iraqi state. Additionally, the U.S. continued to push for sanctions to remain until Saddam was 
removed from office. In 1997, Madeleine Albright, the then Secretary of State, said, “We do not 
agree with those nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons 
of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted,” despite the fact that the sanctions were 
specifically imposed to enforce the decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction.17 Hans 
von Sponeck said that various officials under both the Clinton and George H.W. Bush 
governments made absolutely clear that the sanctions would remain as long as Saddam did, a 
policy formalized by Congress in 1998. Von Sponeck argues that this hard line policy made the 
Iraqi government less cooperative with the UN.18 Though the regime initially cooperated with 
UNSCOM inspections, U.S. policy continued to hold Iraqi people hostage as a bargaining tool 
for regime change, a bargain which failed to motivate a dictator to sacrifice his own power. 
 There were those within both the UN and the U.S. government who felt the long-term 
enforcement of these sanctions was inhumane. Questions were raised, even fairly early on in the 
sanctions period, about the effectiveness of U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Saddam and 
the toll it was taking on the Iraqi people. In 1991, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David 
Mack said in an interview that he believed the U.S. government had underestimated both the 
 
17 Madeleine Albright, Lecture at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 26 March 1997, quoted in 
Stephen Zunes “The US Obsession with Iraq and the Triumph of Militarism,” in Iraq: The Human Cost of History, 
ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and William W. Haddad, (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004), 180. 
18 Hans-Christof Sponeck, A Different Kind of War: The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2006), 266. 
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ability of the Iraqi government to survive sanctions economically and “the degree to which the 
regime was willing to make its people suffer.”19 Three UN officials also resigned over the 
prolonged sanctions. Dennis Halliday, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq resigned in 
1998 after a 34-year career with the UN, said that the sanctions amounted to genocide of the 
Iraqi people.20 Hans von Sponeck, another long-term UN official who took over for Halliday, 
resigned in 2000 along with Jutta Burghardt, head of the UN World Food Programme, over the 
sanctions. Von Sponeck has since published a book detailing his experiences coordinating 
sanctions and the Oil-for-Food Program (OFF). He takes issue with the UN’s human rights 
reporting on Iraq during the sanctions era, particularly the reporting of Max van der Stoel, stating 
that these reports routinely emphasized the right to food and health as critical areas of human 
rights failures in Iraq, but placed the blame for failing to meet these needs entirely on the Iraqi 
government.21 Von Sponeck believed that a critical and recurring failure in UN reporting was its 
inability to see its own sanctions regime as a factor in Iraqi human rights conditions.  
The failure of the UN to address the human rights consequences of sanctions, despite 
widespread critique, was also clear with regard to women’s rights. That sanctions had a 
disproportionate effect on women was understood; the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action at the World Conference on Women lists as an action to be taken by governments, 
international, and regional organizations in paragraph 145 (i): “Take measures in accordance 
with international law with a view to alleviating the negative impact of economic sanctions on 
women and children.”22 Both the 1994 and 1998 Periodic Reports from Iraq on the Convention 
 
19 Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 62. 
20 Mark Siegal, “Former UN Official Says Sanctions against Iraq Amount to ‘Genocide,’” Cornell 
Chronicle, accessed November 11, 2019, https://news.cornell.edu/stories/1999/09/former-un-official-says-sanctions-
against-iraq-amount-genocide. 
21 Von Sponeck, A Different Kind of War, 257. 




on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) strongly 
emphasize the sanctions as the primary barrier to improving women’s status and rights.23 
It is in this context that we now turn to the specific experiences of Iraqi women under 
sanctions. It is important to understand the structural flaws of the sanctions and the OFF 
program, as well as the failures of the UN to take responsibility for worsening human rights 
situations, as we discuss the daily realities of Iraqi women. The program of sanctions, violently 
and unjustly conceptualized without considering the violence that would be inflicted on Iraqi 
bodies, also inflicted gender-specific forms of violence on Iraqi women.  
 
Women and Work 
 It is impossible to understand the impacts of sanctions on the lives of Iraqi women 
without also understanding the conditions created by the Iran-Iraq war and the 1990 Gulf War, 
which further exacerbated the damage. The 8-year Iran-Iraq war ended a mere two years prior to 
the start of sanctions, and the shifts in Iraq’s economic, family structures, and gender relations 
clearly carried over into the sanctions period. The Gulf War at the opening of the sanctions era 
caused direct damage to the population and infrastructure of Iraq that also continued to impact 
the country during sanctions. It may never be possible to fully disentangle these catastrophic 
events from each other, nor any of them from the effects of the 2003 invasion. The sanctions 
regime sometimes doubled down on bad existing conditions for women during the previous 
decade, and sometimes initiated a shift away from the realities of wartime.  
 
23 “Concluding Observations” on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, (United Nations Report, 1994), 33; “Second and Third Periodic Reports of Iraq on the 
Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” (United 
Nations Report, 1998), 8.   
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The Iran-Iraq war contributed to a rise of women in the workplace simply because so 
much of the male population of Iraq was either conscripted or volunteered to fight in the war. 
Women increasingly became the primary breadwinners as their male relatives fought and died in 
the war. The state simultaneously lauded women as workers keeping the nation afloat and as 
mothers of the new nation, emphasizing the importance of childbirth in the face of massive 
population losses.24 These dual expectations often conflicted for women, who bore many burdens 
of keeping the nation together during wartime.  
The sanctions era opened in a context where men were returning from war in search of 
work and women were increasingly encouraged to turn to motherhood as their national role. As 
sanctions began to take effect and further harm the Iraqi economy, women were increasingly 
discouraged from working. While there were few jobs available for anyone, those jobs that did 
arise were more likely to be taken by men. Men without work often found jobs peddling food or 
driving taxis, jobs typically considered unacceptable for women.25 The pressure for women to 
leave work occurred both through changing social dynamics and through the elimination of 
government programs that had allowed women to work in the public sphere. Socially, the role of 
women became “umm bait muhtarama, the respectable housewife;” this represents a sharp 
change from the rhetoric of the 1970s and 80s celebrating women workers. In 1975 Saddam gave 
a speech condemning the “bourgeois ideology which assumes that the first and last role of 
women is in the home.”26  
On a national level, women were encouraged to resign or retire early and resignation was 
incentivized by the termination of government programs providing free childcare and public 
 
24 Al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 168. 
25 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 37. 
26 Ibid, 10.  
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transportation. Women had been the primary recipients of the welfare state more broadly, and so 
were most affected by its collapse under sanctions.27 Iraq’s 1998 report to the UN on the 
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) discussed the 
impacts of sanctions on women’s work participation. The report states that “the difficult 
economic conditions created by the comprehensive embargo have also forced large numbers of 
Iraqi women to… devote themselves to domestic work.” This shifts the blame onto the sanctions, 
but ignores that the regime was actively promoting the domestic role of women and removing 
social programs to encourage women’s work. In reference to childcare for women workers, 
which had previously been free, the report notes that the number of facilities actually increased 
from 1987-1996, but ignores that the programs for subsidized childcare had ended under 
sanctions.28 With the collapse of the welfare state, along with an erosion of extended family and 
neighborhood networks, women were increasingly required to care for their own children and 
thus were unable to work in the public sphere. The sanctions reduced economic opportunities for 
everyone, but the state and society worked to shift the loss of work onto women so as to preserve 
the opportunities for men, particularly by reducing state support for women workers.  
 
Women’s Political Participation and the General Federation of Iraqi Women 
One specific example of the declining income opportunities for women was the 
stratification of the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) under sanctions. The GFIW was 
essentially the women’s branch of the Ba‘th party and was controlled and funded by the state. 
This group was a key space for women’s political participation towards the goal of promoting 
 
27 Al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 188; Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women Between Dictatorship, 
War, Sanctions, and Occupation,” Third World Quarterly, 26, no. 4-5 (2008), 747. 
28 “Second and Third Periodic Reports,” 8. 
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women’s equality. It is critical to note that women’s political participation, like that of all Iraqi 
citizens, was severely limited throughout the Ba‘th era because Iraq was a one-party state. 
Information on the political participation of women outside the Ba‘th party is therefore limited 
because these groups were forced to hide their operations from the regime. However, the role of 
women in the Ba‘th party was a key point of Ba‘thi rhetoric, and the GFIW was the key state 
mechanism for mobilizing women.  
The experience of women in GFIW represents only a small section of Iraqi women, as it 
was only open to Ba‘thi women, but it did serve as a critical source of income for many women 
prior to sanctions. Some members were able to use the funds allocated by the state to mobilize 
Iraqi women and change their lives, and the GFIW was often in tension with Ba‘thi leadership, 
pushing them on issues of women’s equality.29 However, after sanctions, the conditions changed 
dramatically. One employee, Soha, told Al-Jawaheri that her salary was $320 USD per month 
prior to sanctions. However, during sanctions, her salary dropped to $3.50 USD; she said, “‘now’ 
there are a few women who gain from being employees here, while the rest get nothing.”30 She 
also describes how high ranking GFIW women received millions of Iraqi Dinars as well as 
“valuable gifts from the delegations.” These gifts were typically humanitarian aid, intended for 
the population, but stolen and distributed to friends of the regime, according a GFIW 
informant.31 Meanwhile, women like Soha, who had previously held a relatively privileged 
position as party members, were forced to take up informal work for secondary sources of 
income. The 1998 CEDAW report, speaking of women’s political participation, claimed that 
“any diminution in the role of women is due to the embargo and to their preoccupation with 
 
29 Al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 138.  
30 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 49. 
31 Ibid.  
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shouldering the burdens of the household.”32 This claim is clearly inaccurate considering that 
certain GFIW women were able to materially benefit from sanctions. The GFIW saw not a 
unilateral loss of benefits, but rather an increased stratification between the top-ranking members 
and the larger base of employees. These leading members of the GFIW were, as Al-Ali puts it 
“themselves part of oppressive political and social structures.”33 The women who had used the 
GFIW to mobilize for legitimate social change were severely disadvantaged under sanctions, 
while women who facilitated the continuation of oppressive class, gender, ethnic, and political 
structures benefitted materially. This stratification had negative implications both for the 
continued political participation of women and for their income.  
The GFIW can be partially understood as an effort of “state feminism,” a process by 
which the state coopted feminist struggle in order to control its progress, while simultaneously 
suppressing other, non-state sanctioned feminist activity. The stratification of wealth in the 
GFIW reflected the broader issues with state control of funds and programs during sanctions; 
Saddam and other leading party members gained vast personal wealth through criminal activities 
such as smuggling.34 The GFIW thus served as a microcosm for understanding Iraq at large and 
the implications of the one-party system during this time. Women lost avenues for social 
mobilization as well as access to work and pay, along with the rest of the Iraqi population. This 
example also illustrates the importance of adding a class and political analysis to the gendered 
experience of sanctions. The shifts in the GFIW benefitted some women as much as they 
disadvantaged others.  
 
 
32 Ibid, 9. 
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Iraqi women also experienced a decline in educational opportunities during sanctions. 
Prior to sanctions, Iraq’s education system was very advanced; education was mandatory from 
ages 6-12 for all children, and education was free at all levels. The regime also made major 
efforts to make education accessible for people of all socioeconomic backgrounds. By 1990, 
women’s education had increased rapidly; female enrollment in secondary school increased to 
38.5%, and though young women came from families where most of their mothers were 
illiterate, in higher education women were a majority of students.35 Women’s education was a 
key part of the state feminist rhetoric. In a 1971 speech, Saddam said “what a crime it would be 
against the younger generation if women were deprived of their rights to freedom, education, and 
full participation in… the community.”36 Improving women’s education rates also has serious 
implications for women’s health, increased fertility, and reduced overall child mortality rates, so 
the state project also served a public health purpose.37 However, a study of women in Iraq 
conducted prior to sanctions and published in 1990 suggests that, socially, education for women 
was still perceived as a way to improve one’s status for marriage.38 Though the improvement of 
women’s education existed within a social context that still limited women’s full participation, 
its rise in the decades prior to sanctions can still be seen in relatively positive terms; women 
(especially working class women) had greater access to resources that had previously posed a 
barrier to education. While the social context remained limiting for women’s full pursuit of 
educational goals, class barriers to education were at least minimized.  
 
35 Ibid, 58, 61; Sana Khayyat, Honour and Shame: Women in Modern Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 1990), 
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However, under sanctions, female education declined sharply, and the class and public 
health improvements were effectively eliminated. By 2000, illiteracy rates among Iraqi women 
were at 71% for females age 15-24. Though primary education remained mandatory, statistics 
show that over 1.5 million Iraqi girls eligible for primary school were not enrolled in the 2000-
2001 school year. Female enrollment in secondary school dropped to 29%, lower than it had 
been in the 1970s.39 Though strides had been made to eliminate socioeconomic barriers to 
education in previous decades, much of this was reversed under sanctions. And although 
education remained technically free, certain school supplies were no longer covered and many 
families were unable to pay.40 Additionally, many young women were expected to make money 
for their families in the informal economy (often through begging or theft) and did not have time 
or funds to attend school.41 Those that were able to attend school experienced increasingly 
unmaintained school facilities and increasingly underpaid teachers. The Iraqi blogger Riverbend 
wrote that science classes in the universities suffered because their materials were banned under 
the sanctions, and many textbooks were impossible to get as well.42 Whatever efforts had been 
made to make education accessible to all genders and classes were effectively reversed under 
sanctions.  
The effects of this educational decline were crucially not limited to the scope of 
education. The loss of subsidized educational resources had serious implications for both class 
stratification and public health. Working class women and girls were kept out of education by the 
reconstruction of financial barriers. With regards to public health, studies have shown that in 
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Southwest Asia and North Africa, education is a critical factor for improving women’s planning 
for childbirth and raising the age of marriage and first childbirth. Under sanctions in Iraq, 
fertility rates rose to 5.4 births per the average woman by 2003, which is nearly the global high, 
while child mortality and morbidity simultaneously rose to the highest regional rate.43 The 
collapse of women’s education cannot be disentangled from the public health crisis under 
sanctions, nor from the lasting psychological and physical trauma experienced by so many 
women who gave birth while experiencing malnutrition, anemia, or other health crises, many of 
whom subsequently lost their children. The violence of sanctions extends beyond the failure to 
take responsibility for human rights crises; it lies also in the inability to connect the wide range 
of human rights impacts. When we discuss the violence of the public health crisis, we cannot 
separate this from the crisis of women’s education and work, the re-emphasis of women’s role as 
mothers, and the long-term psychological impacts.  
 
Family and Marriage 
Nuclearizing Family Structures  
The family structure of Iraqi society and the role of women in the family were affected 
not only by declining employment and educational opportunities, but also by the medical impacts 
of sanctions, including the deaths of children. By 1996, it was estimated that sanctions had killed 
over half a million Iraqi children, a death toll that UN representative Madeleine Albright 
infamously said was “worth it.”44 More recently, some studies have called into question the 
extent of child mortality and proposed that child death estimates were inflated by the regime.45 
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However, several studies, using more conservative estimates, have still found remarkably high 
child mortality rates. Under-5 mortality in south and central Iraq were found to have increased 
from 56 per 1000 births in 1984-1989 to 131 per 1000 births in 1994-1999. In Kurdistan, under-5 
mortality actually decreased from 80 to 72 per 1000 births in the same period.46 Case studies of 
Iraqi women show that the fear of child death had strong social impacts on Iraqi women and the 
family experience. The impacts of these deaths on Iraqi families was particularly pronounced for 
lower class families, who were more likely to experience child mortality.47 Women’s family role 
began to change significantly even prior to the imposition of international sanctions, during the 
Iran-Iraq war when the government outlawed contraceptives and emphasized the role of women 
in reproducing the Iraqi population to compensate for the massive death toll of the war. This ban 
on family planning continued into the sanctions period, but while women were still encouraged 
to have many children, there was a greater reluctance to have children for fear that children 
would die or that they would be unable to feed them. Additionally, the mass casualties of Iraqi 
men during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, as well as rising economic migration of men, created a 
large number of female-headed households, in Basra as high as 60%.48  As women were being 
encouraged to have more children, they were also increasingly the sole providers for these 
children in an economy where they were discouraged from working.  
One such woman was Halimah, a 20 year old war widow and mother interviewed by Al-
Jawaheri, whose case shows the collapse of kinship and neighborhood networks as a mechanism 
for survival. Under sanctions, families shifted away from broader kinship networks and towards 
the importance of the nuclear family.49 Here it is important to address that, though the nuclear 
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family holds a particular importance in Western modernization, it should not be viewed as such 
in the Iraqi context. Indeed, in Iraq, the shift away from extended networks may have led to more 
oppressive patriarchal relations. In Halimah’s case, her neighborhood network of support no 
longer existed because everyone had become extremely poor under sanctions. “We feel we have 
been abandoned and that nobody can help us. We know we are forgotten.”50 Halimah’s desperate 
condition forced her to turn to her brother and brother-in-law for support, but both were highly 
aggressive towards her and attempted to control her and her daughter. Yasmin Al-Jawaheri 
argues that women who lacked support from both the state and a broad family network under 
sanctions were further subordinated because they developed “high dependency ratio on a single 
male provider.”51 Halimah’s case is one example of how the deterioration of broad family 
networks created more oppressive family relations for women.  
 
Marriage as Survival 
Given the importance of support from a male provider for many women, marriage 
became increasingly important for young Iraqi women under sanctions, at the same time as it 
became harder to find a husband due to the gender imbalance in Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war. 
Hamdiya, a woman interviewed by Al-Ali, stated that, whereas it had once been considered 
taboo to not get married or to enter a polygamous marriage, “among my generation, there are 
many women who either did not get married… or became the second wife of someone.”52 She 
also noted that many women married older expatriates. Polygamous marriages, which had been 
sharply reduced and condemned by the regime in previous eras, were revived in the 1990s. In a 
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1976 address to the General Federation of Iraqi Women, Saddam had stated the importance of 
“strengthening and expanding the conditions which prohibit polygamy.”53 And yet under 
sanctions, polygamous marriages increased dramatically, largely out of economic necessity.54  
The desirability of a husband was no longer based on love and family reputation, but 
instead based almost entirely on whether he could provide for his wife. As such, class dynamics 
of marriage also shifted. Increasingly, middle-class women from important families who had 
suffered under sanctions came to marry nouveau riche sanctions profiteers, primarily Oil-for-
Food contractors and oil smugglers, despite the fact that marriage below one’s family status had 
previously been very uncommon.55 This indicates that money came to surpass family name in 
determining social status. However, the limited number of husbands who could provide 
economic protection also meant that many lower-class women were either not able to marry as 
middle class women were or were not able to use marriage as a source of economic protection. 
Whereas middle- and upper-class women focused heavily on marriage as a source of survival, 
and thus were often forced into harmful or difficult marriages, lower class women were more 
likely to experience very direct forms of gender-based violence through “honor” crimes or were 
forced into sex work for survival. Changing marriage expectations should be understood as a 
highly class-specific gender impact of sanctions.  
 
Violence Against Women 
“Honor” Killings and Domestic Violence 
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  “Honor” killing describes a particular circumstance; that is, the murder of women, 
typically by family members, as a reaction to the perception that the woman has “dishonored” 
the family. 56 The acts that are considered “dishonorable” are rooted in restrictive 
heteropatriarchal social boundaries for women. Under sanctions, Iraq saw a revival of “honor” 
killings and domestic violence; economic crisis and war have both been well documented as key 
contributors to gender-based violence. The revival of “honor” killings in Iraq occurred not only 
on a popular level under sanctions but was also encouraged by the state effectively legalizing 
“honor” crimes. In 1990, Saddam issued a decree granting immunity to men accused of 
committing “honor” crimes (i.e. crimes against women suspected of having violated codes of 
social conduct.)57 Though this ruling was appealed two months later, this law granted legitimacy 
to “honor” crimes beyond the scope of its existence, as the UN tracked an increase in “honor” 
crimes during the 1990s compared to previous decades; approximately 4,000 women and girls 
were murdered between 1990 and 2002 in so-called “honor” killings. It is unclear why this law 
was passed, though Al-Jawaheri and Al-Ali both suggest that it was a tactic to gain the support of 
conservative tribal and religious leaders in preparation for the invasion of Kuwait.58 The desire 
by the regime to acquire the loyalty of tribal leaders continued during the sanctions period, and 
men who killed female relatives for the purpose of preserving family “honor” were regularly 
 
56 It is necessary to explain my stylization of “honor.” Though the term “honor killings” has been criticized 
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acquitted.59 The legal system clearly came to increasingly favor those who committed “honor” 
crimes rather than the victims of these crimes. 
The rise in “honor” crimes contributed to real fears and changes in social dynamics for 
young girls. Fifteen year old Zeinab described the changes women had to make in daily life to 
prevent social criticism that could potentially damage a family’s “honor,” including increasingly 
conservative dress; “Most people are somewhat pressured to change their lives in order to protect 
themselves from… talk about family honour.”60 
Domestic violence, too, was increasingly a product of economic insecurities. Both men 
and women encouraged and perpetrated this violence against other women; al-Jawaheri 
interviewed one woman, 20 year old Fatima, who was physically abused by her husband when 
she fought back against his plan to take a second, older, wife from a wealthy family in order to 
improve his economic position. Fatima’s mother in law encouraged the abuse and also took 
control over her children. In her interview, Fatima said “My children are not mine. They are 
hers.”61 Though al-Jawaheri notes that it is very difficult to understand the extent of domestic 
violence in Iraq because it is not openly discussed, she believes that relationships like Fatima’s 
with her mother-in-law were increasingly common during sanctions, as older women sought a 
“stake in the system of domination” while opportunity for the family’s economic stability 
diminished.62Violence against women was not merely a result of the economic stress of men, but 
of the broader stresses placed on the entire community.  
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Violence Against Sex Workers 
Related to the rise in “honor” crimes and domestic violence was the increased violence 
against those engaging in sex work. This coincided with a rise in sex work given the limited 
opportunities for women to make money under sanctions. Iraq saw, for the first time, the 
development of luxury brothels, the patrons of which were primarily sanctions profiteers and 
members of the regime. Sex work quickly became a critical source of income to many women.63 
Given its complicity in the sex work sector, the regime initially supported, or at least failed to 
interfere in the rising industry. However, beginning in 2000, the regime reportedly beheaded 
more than 300 people accused of engaging in or facilitating sex work. One such incident 
occurred in November 2000 when two sex workers in Baghdad were beheaded in front of their 
homes. This public murder occurred in the morning and was witnessed by several neighbors, 
including children who were on their way to school. Those living nearby said that the entire area 
was left in a “shocked state.”64 It was well known that the clients of these women had been high-
ranking government officials. To the populace witnessing these acts of violence, the general 
perception was that it was an attempt on the part of the state to reassert its control over women 
and the social order. There is also a general consensus among scholars that this attack on sex 
workers, like the legalization of “honor” crimes, was an effort by the regime to gain the favor of 
tribal and religious leaders in a period of increased social conservatism under sanctions.65 The 
sanctions contributed to both a rise in sex work as a means of economic survival and a rise in 
social conservatism which punished women, violently, for these particular acts of survival. This 
form of violence, committed by the state against women whose “crimes” depended on the 
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participation of state actors, is merely evidence of the blatant double standard in morality for a 
patriarchal state structure. Regardless of the state’s efforts to promote women’s liberation and 
equal rights in previous decades, the intensity of the violence committed on women’s bodies by 
state actors during sanctions shows that the state was interested primarily in maintaining its 
control on women.  
 
Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan 
Kurdish women experienced the violence of sanctions differently because of their 
position in a targeted ethnic minority as well as their gender. Kurdish women are certainly not 
the only ethnic minority to face ethnic and gender violence under sanctions, and in fact because 
of their geographic separation and autonomy from Central and Southern Iraq, are not necessarily 
representative of the experiences of other ethnic minority women, on whom there is 
unfortunately little data or study. It should also be noted that many non-Kurdish ethno-religious 
minorities, including Yezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Christians, and Turcomans, often identified 
themselves as Kurdish when no other option was presented and many resided in the northern 
regions designated as Kurdistan.66 Ethnic minority women, like poor women, faced particularly 
difficult conditions under sanctions.  
Certain specificities of the sanctions era in Iraqi Kurdistan should be noted. Iraqi 
Kurdistan, located in the North, had been a target of state violence as an ethnic minority region. 
The UN did not view Kurdistan as the primary target of sanctions, especially given that the 
Kurdish population had been the targets of chemical attacks, and some UN aid programs 
attempted to mitigate the effects of sanctions on Kurdistan, but Kurdistan was not exempt from 
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sanctions. The sanctions era in Kurdistan has been described as “double embargo” because of the 
impacts of both international sanctions and the Iraqi central government’s economic targeting of 
the region, including power blackouts and currency manipulation which forced Kurdistan to 
abandon the Iraqi dinar.67 This is consistent with the conclusions of Lv and Xu that economic 
sanctions increase ethnic violence, in this case the violence being economic neglect.68 However, 
Kurdistan also experienced a much higher rate of international aid than the rest of Iraq, as well as 
a cash component to the OFF program not granted to the Central and South regions.69  In part 
this aid was related to the international perception of the Kurdish population as victims of the 
regime after the chemical attacks during the Anfal campaign genocide, though the same effort at 
protecting victims of the regime did not seem to apply to other ethnic minorities, marginalized 
populations, or, for that matter, most of the civilians who suffered under sanctions while the 
regime escaped virtually unscathed. In addition to large amounts of aid, the de facto 
establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992 allowed some regional 
autonomy, though Kurdish autonomy was not recognized by the Iraqi state until Saddam was 
overthrown in 2003. Furthermore, Kurdish autonomy has done little to foster Kurdish women’s 
liberation.  
The particularities of the sanctions era in Iraqi Kurdistan included a marked rise in 
“honor” killings, beyond that of Iraq at large. Although Kurdish women had long been central in 
the Kurdish independence struggle, the growth of aid allowed them to participate in large 
numbers in the emerging civil society, strengthening women’s political organizing around issues 
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of gender and violence. However, these women’s rights groups depend on the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for their continued 
existence.70 This helps explain why the presence of humanitarian groups and the rise in women’s 
organizations has actually corresponded with a rise in “honor” killings and domestic violence in 
the so-called “safe haven.” The KRG has made little headway in terms of improving the position 
of Kurdish women and has often actively worked against this goal. Zouzan, a Kurdish activist 
fighting against “honor” killings in the 1990s stated that “both political parties, the PUK and the 
KDP, gave us a hard time. They really harassed us.”71 Zouzan ultimately exiled herself and 
continued her activism from abroad because of this harrassment. In relation to “honor” killings, 
the specific language of “honor” was removed from Kurdish law in 2002, but Kurdish women’s 
rights activists still report that these crimes go largely unpunished.72 As Saddam’s legalization of 
“honor” crimes was an attempt to consolidate support from conservative tribal leaders, so can the 
KRG’s failure to prosecute murderers for “honor” be seen as an attempt to consolidate power in 
a newly formed autonomous parastate. Additionally, after violent conflicts between the KDP and 
PUK in 1994, efforts to consolidate tribal support increased even further.73 
Because Kurdistan operated under a semi-autonomous legal structure, the development of 
legal rights for women is different than in the rest of Iraq, but the sanctions period disadvantaged 
women in this region as well. Indeed, following the creation of the KRG and establishment of 
Kurdistan as a “safe haven,” Kurdish women saw an increase in instances of domestic violence.74 
Kurdistan also experienced high rates of female headed households, exacerbated by the ethnic 
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violence it has suffered and the disappearances of Kurdish men; some relief workers estimated 
between 3000 and 3500 female heads of household, or “Anfal widows,” in the Barzan valley 
alone.75 Many women who lived through Anfal had also been raped, and over 700 girls were 
kidnapped and sold to neighboring countries as a part of the violence; the Anfal widows suffered 
compound traumas to their bodies and their families, as well as social ostracization for losing 
their “honor” as survivors of rape.76 The struggles of these widows were perhaps somewhat 
mediated by the large concentration of relief workers, many of them focusing on supporting 
female headed households. Still, as with honor killings, widespread aid did not seem to correlate 
with widespread relief of women’s problems. As late as 2007, 83% of these women had housing 
problems.77  
 
Final Considerations on Violence Against Women  
 The various types of gender-based violence described above are by no means a 
comprehensive picture of the many forms of violence experienced by Iraqi women at alarming 
rates during the sanctions era. Iraq also experienced a rise in street violence, including robbing, 
rape, kidnapping, and murder, ofted targetting women. Women and girls sometimes disappeared 
from in front of their own homes, and women who could afford to took taxis to and from home 
for fear of leaving their home, even within their own neighborhoods.78 Essentially, sanctions 
created widespread social chaos that produced lasting psychological damage for the entire 
population of Iraq. Batuol, an Iraqi social scientist interviewed by Al-Jawaheri, described this 
well: “It’s hardly surprising that economic deprivation and impoverishment have caused such 
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wide-scale social distortion. The Iraqi society today is a masterpiece produced by the United 
Nations sanctions… It’s true that the whole society is suffering, but it is women who are the 
prime victims.”79 
In tracing gender-based violence, it is further important to highlight the differential 
impacts of violence based on women’s class status. Al-Ali writes that “for educated, middle-
class women from urban areas, it was not so much honour crimes they feared as diminished 
marriage prospects.”80 It should be noted that violence against sex workers and women accused 
of violating “honor” codes impacted working-class women far more than middle or upper class 
women, in part because these women were more likely to be driven to sex work as a means of 
survival. Additionally, marriage was increasingly a means of economic and social protection, but 
it was deeply based in class dynamics and many middle-class women struggled to find husbands, 
making the marriage prospects for lower-class women even smaller. Violence against women in 
the name of social conservatism most often impacted working-class women, who were also the 
greatest victims of sanctions more broadly. 
It is worth remembering that while “honor” killings and other gender based violence 
increased during the sanctions period, they increased even further after the 2003 invasion. In the 
sanctions period, the Iraqi government took a permissive attitude towards these crimes in order 
to maintain loyalty ties with tribal and religious leaders. In the post-invasion period, the 
increased sectarianization of rule under the U.S. occupation and the weakening of the central 
government left tribal and religious leaders with greater control, further contributing to violence 
against women.  
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Conclusions: Beyond Sanctions and the Revolutionary Present 
 It is difficult to know how to conclude this essay given that the conditions for Iraqis in 
general, and Iraqi women in particular, have only worsened since the end of sanctions. The 
fragmentation of the country by ISIS and control of other foreign states, the endless U.S. 
occupation following the bloody 2003 invasion, the sanctions era, the Gulf War, the 8-year Iran-
Iraq war, and the brutal policies of the Ba‘th party mean that Iraq has experienced at least 40 
years of continual violence and destruction with little chance to recover. The violence on Iraq, 
and the further marginalization of Iraqi women because of this violence, is ongoing. This essay 
focuses on a specific set of policies and a specific population, women, to explore only some of 
the many ways that violence has manifested in Iraq. This focus deconstructs a particular 
narrative about the sanctions on Iraq, namely that they were a nonviolent alternative to war, and 
that the regime, rather than the UN or U.S., was solely responsible for human rights abuses. The 
scope of this essay also fits into a broader, emerging conversation about the violence of sanctions 
as international policy more generally, and the particular populations that experience targeted 
violence under economic sanctions.   
 My goal is not to suggest that Iraqi men have not also suffered under sanctions or in the 
decades since. Iraqi men have also experienced economic and physical violence, and for certain 
populations of men, such as ethnic minority or lower-class men, the impacts of sanctions and war 
may have been greater than for certain Iraqi women. But the gender focus of this paper has led to 
the conclusion that sanctions indeed have a variety of gender-specific, negative impacts. A 
policy cannot claim to be nonviolent if a consistent and severe “side effect” of that policy is an 
increase in violence against the target state’s most marginalized populations, including, among 
others, gender, ethnic, and class minority groups. If the United Nations and the international 
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community are genuinely interested in preventing human rights violations and ending all 
discrimination against women, it is no longer viable for them to continue to enact and enforce 
economic sanctions as they have historically been implemented. 
 I would also like to turn, beyond the scope of this paper, to the present, in order to 
understand not only the lasting effects of sanctions and war on Iraq and situate the current 
revolution in Iraq in relation to the ongoing impacts of sanctions on the region.  
 Iraq remains devastated by ongoing violence and foreign control of a fragmented state. 
But it is also clear that, despite the present lived reality in Iraq, many revolutionaries trace the 
conditions in Iraq back to the sanctions era. Reports show that 58.43% of the population of Iraq 
is under the age of 24, and 39.01% are under age 15.81 For these young people, their only reality 
has been life under imperial control. Some of them were born into sanctions, but most were born 
into the post-sanctions, post-invasion destruction of Iraq. It is no wonder that Iraqis of all ages 
are currently taking to the streets to fight for their rights to live; the most chilling element of 
these protests is their primary slogan: Nureed Watan - We Want a Country.82 A further 
characteristic of this revolution is the participation of young women and girls, whose 
participation is truly powerful considering that, through sanctions and occupation, Iraq has 
become increasingly socially conservative and opposed to women’s political participation. In 
addition to facing the violent reaction of the state, women revolutionaries have faced threats and 
disapproval from families, and several female activists have been abducted or killed for their 
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participation in the revolution.83 And yet these women continue to show up for national 
liberation; they too want a country. Their participation in the revolution is also related to their 
oppression as women; women emphasized the poor conditions of their education and the 
ostracization of women in political movements as key motivators for their participation, 
alongside their national goals.84 This is understandable when we take time to examine the 
historical intersection of imperial policy and violence against women during sanctions. The 
revolution that began on October 25, 2019 (sometimes called the October Revolution) is an 
inspiring example of a people attempting to heal their country, and the power of the women 
revolutionaries in particular is a direct challenge to the gendered violence of international policy.  
Among other focuses of the Iraq Revolution is the need to fight back against Iranian 
interference in Iraqi governance, which flourished after the 2003 invasion. Iran is currently the 
target of U.S. sanctions and, though these sanctions are not directly comparable to those enforced 
on Iraq, they have had ongoing violent impacts on Iranians. The sanctions on Iran have also 
continued to harm Iraq; because of Iran’s influence on Iraq, and particularly Iraq’s economic 
importance to Iran, some have posited that the intensification of sanctions by the U.S. has caused 
the Iranian government to crack down more violently on protests in Iraq.85  
It is impossible to separate these ongoing histories from the international sanctions 
policies that have targeted these states and contributed to the further economic marginalization of 
already marginalized populations. The people of Iraq, Iran, and many other countries in the 
Global South are risking their lives to revolt against the conditions that sanctions have helped 
 
83 Balsam Mustafa, “I Spoke to the Women Risking Their Lives to Join the Iraq Revolution - And This is 
What They Want,” Independent, November 5, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iraq-revolution-women-
protests-iran-lebanon-a9186141.html 
84 Ibid.   




create. For those of us in the Global North, the very least we can do is follow their lead and 
revolutionize international relations. If, as Georgis and Gewarges suggest, we can center the 
people experiencing bodily harm as a direct result of these policies in formulating international 
policies, we might begin to approach an alternative to the senseless violence that comes from 
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